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WHY ANTITRUST, NOT UNIONIZATION, IS THE ANSWER
TO UNDERPAYMENT OF STUDENT-ATHLETES
ABSTRACT
This Comment examines whether student-athletes should be allowed to
unionize and collectively bargain for their rights and will present a legal
argument against the unionization of student-athletes. The reasoning behind this
argument is that student-athletes are not employees, and therefore, are not able
to unionize. Even if student-athletes were categorized as employees, they would
struggle to collectively bargain for their rights due to various states’ laws that
prohibit public employees from unionizing. Rather, this Comment argues that
the answer to solving college athlete underpayment is through the remedies that
can be provided in antitrust law. The reasoning behind this argument is that
student-athletes are independent contractors, and revenue-generating college
athletics programs are guilty of price-fixing the cost of labor for these studentathletes’ services.
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INTRODUCTION
Student-Athletes are talented, hardworking individuals who have
dedicated their young lives to excelling in specific sports. As amici
describe, Student-Athletes work an average of 35–40 hours per week
on athletic duties during their months-long athletic seasons, and most
work similar hours during the off-season to stay competitive. At the
same time, most of them do their best to succeed academically,
managing to devote on average another 40 hours per week to classes
and study. Nevertheless, their coaches and others in the Division 1
ecosystem make sure that Student-Athletes put athletics first, which
makes it difficult for them to compete for academic success with
students more focused on academics. They are often forced to miss
class, to neglect their studies, and to forego courses whose schedules
conflict with the sports in which they participate. In addition to
lessening their chances at academic success because of the time they
must devote to their sports obligations, Student-Athletes are often
prevented from obtaining internships or part-time paying jobs, and, as
a result, often lack both income and marketable work experience.
Meanwhile, the grueling hours and physical demands of college sports
carry significant health risks, such as sleep deprivation, stress, broken
bones, and even potential brain damage. Despite their best efforts,
however, fewer than 5% of Student-Athletes will ever play at a
professional level, and most of those lucky few will stay in the pros
only a few short years. In short, the college years are likely the only
years when young Student-Athletes have any realistic chance of
earning a significant amount of money or achieving fame as a result of
their athletic skills.1

Judge Milan Smith’s concurring opinion in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston v. NCAA, whose majority
opinion was later affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 2020 term, provides a
cogent depiction of the plight of many collegiate student-athletes. This troubling
reality has caused some people to call for student-athletes to be allowed to
unionize and collectively bargain for their rights.2
This Comment examines whether student-athletes should be allowed to
unionize and collectively bargain for their rights and will present a legal
argument against the unionization of student-athletes. Part I explains why
1

Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1266 (9th Cir.
2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
2 See, e.g., Dan Wolken, Opinion: Allowing college athletes to unionize could be the answer to the
NCAA’s
problems,
USA
TODAY
(May
27,
2021,
5:37
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2021/05/27/allowing-college-athletes-unionizecould-help-solve-ncaa-problems/7476234002/.
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student-athletes should not attempt to unionize. However, not all hope is lost for
student-athletes. In Part II, this Comment explains why antitrust law could be
the cure to underpayment of student-athletes.
I. SHOULD STUDENT-ATHLETES ATTEMPT TO UNIONIZE?
To properly address whether student-athletes should attempt to unionize, this
Comment will first explain how unionization works. Next, the question whether
student-athletes are employees will be tackled. Then, some potential issues that
could arise in the context of student-athlete unionization will be addressed.
A. How Does Unionization Work?
A union is “[a]n organization formed to negotiate with employers, on behalf
of workers collectively, about job-related issues such as salary, benefits, hours,
and working conditions.”3 The right to form a union in the United States is
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).4 Section 7 of the
NLRA provides three basic rights for workers.5 The first basic right is the right
to form, join, and assist labor organizations.6 The second is the right to
collectively bargain through representatives chosen by the workers. 7 The third
is the right for workers to engage in “concerted activities” in order to advance
and protect their interests.8 Some examples of concerted activities include
picketing and striking.9 Section 8(a) of the NLRA prohibits employer
interference with these Section 7 NLRA rights.10 If an employer does
impermissibly interfere with workers’ Section 7 NLRA rights, then an employer
can be subject to penalties imposed by either the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) or the federal courts.11
Unionization is important because analysis shows that unionization helps
workers.12 Unionization helps workers through “higher wages; more and better
3

Union, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
29 U.S.C. § 151; see MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: C ASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 475 (5th ed. 2020).
5
29 U.S.C. § 157; see MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
6 29 U.S.C. § 157; see MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
7 29 U.S.C. § 157; see MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
8 29 U.S.C. § 157; see MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
9 MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
10 29 U.S.C. § 158(a); see id.
11 MITTEN, supra note 4, at 475.
12 See, e.g., Matthew Walters & Lawrence Mishel, How unions help all workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug.
26, 2003), https://files.epi.org/page/-/old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Decline
Of Unions Is Good News, HOOVER INST. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good4
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benefits; more effective utilization of social insurance programs; and more
effective enforcement of legislated labor protections such as safety, health, and
overtime regulations.”13 Accordingly, since student-athletes do not receive any
of these advantages, it is easy to recognize why student-athletes would be
attracted to the idea of unionization.
B. Are Student-Athletes Employees?
In order to determine whether student-athletes can unionize, one must first
determine whether student-athletes are employees. This is because the NLRA
only protects “employees at private-sector workplaces.”14 “Excluded from
coverage under the [NLRA] are public-sector employees . . . , agricultural and
domestic workers, independent contractors, workers employed by a parent or
spouse, employees of air and rail carriers covered by the Railway Labor Act, and
supervisors . . .”15
Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel for the NLRB appointed by President
Biden,16 asserted in a September 2021 memorandum that student-athletes
(specifically, “scholarship football players at Division I FBS private colleges
and universities, and other similarly situated Players at Academic Institutions”)
are employees.17 This idea stems from Abruzzo’s belief that student-athletes
fulfill the common-law employee test.18 An employee is “[s]omeone who works
in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied
contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of
work performance.”19 The employer’s right to control the details of work
performance is crucial to the determination whether a hired party is an
news (“The ensuing higher labor costs, higher costs of negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and higher
labor market uncertainty all undercut the gains to union workers just as they magnify losses to nonunion
employers, as well as to the shareholders, suppliers, and customers of these unionized firms. They also increase
the risk of market disruption from strikes, lockouts, or firm bankruptcies whenever unions or employers overplay
their hands in negotiation. These net losses in capital values reduce the pension fund values of unionized and
nonunionized workers alike.”).
13 Walters & Mishel, supra note 12.
14 National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/
key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
15 Are You Covered?, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/thelaw/employees/are-you-covered (last visited Apr. 6, 2022).
16 The NLRB Welcomes Jennifer Abruzzo as General Counsel, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD. (July 22, 2021),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/the-nlrb-welcomes-jennifer-abruzzo-as-general-counsel.
17 Subject: Statutory Rts. of Players at Acad. Institutions (Student-Athletes) Under the Nat’l Lab. Rels. Act,
No. MEMORANDUM GC 21-08, 2021 WL 4502333, at *2 (Sept. 29, 2021) [hereinafter NLRB Memo GC 2108].
18 Id.
19 Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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employee.20 Other factors (the “Reid factors”) relevant to the inquiry whether a
worker is an employee are: (1) “the skill required,” (2) “the source of the
instrumentalities and tools,” (3) “the location of the work,” (4) “the duration of
the relationship between the parties,” (5) “whether the hiring party has the right
to assign additional projects to the hired party,” (6) “the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work,” (7) “the method of
payment,” (8) “the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants,” (9)
“whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party,” (10)
“whether the hiring party is in business,” (11) “the provision of employee
benefits,” and (12) “the tax treatment of the hired party.”21 In support of
Abruzzo’s assertion that student-athletes are employees, she presents evidence
that student-athletes perform services for their respective universities and the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), that student-athletes
receive significant compensation, and that student-athletes are subject to
substantial control by the NCAA and their respective universities. 22
While Abruzzo’s arguments are compelling, they stand in contrast to the vast
majority of case law.23 Berger v. NCAA is one such case that is illustrative of the
state of the law.24 In Berger, former women’s track and field student-athletes at
the University of Pennsylvania sued the University of Pennsylvania, the NCAA,
and more than 120 other NCAA Division I universities and colleges alleging
that student-athletes are employees who are entitled to a minimum wage under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).25 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana’s ruling stating that “as a matter of law . . . student athletes
are not employees under the FLSA.”26
In Berger, the court says that “[a] majority of courts have concluded—albeit
in different contexts—that student athletes are not employees.”27 The court then

20

See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
Id. at 751-52.
22 NLRB Memo GC 21-08, supra note 17, at *2.
23
See generally Jonathan L. Israel, Repeat After Me: College Athletes Are Not School Employees Under
the
FLSA,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LAB.
&
EMP.
L.
PERSPS.
(Nov.
6,
2017),
https://1npdf11.onenorth.com/pdfrenderer.svc/v1/
abcpdf11/GetRenderedPdfByUrl/Repeat%20After%20Me%20College%20Athletes%20Are%20Not%20Schoo
l%20Em.pdf/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.foley.com%2fen%2finsights%2fpublications%2f2017%2f11%2frep
eat-after-me-college-athletes-are-not-school-em?format=pdf&attachment=false.
24 Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016).
25 Id. at 289.
26 Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 291.
21
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goes on to cite a few of these cases.28 On the other hand, the court could only
find “two courts [that] reached the opposite conclusion.”29 And those cases came
from “over fifty years ago.”30 Moreover, these two cases can be distinguished
because “the student athletes in those cases were also separately employed by
their universities.”31
It is important to weigh the authority of these divergent opinions. On one
hand, NLRB General Counsel memoranda only provide “policy guidance.” 32
They lack the authority to carry out goals of changing the law. 33 On the other
hand, Berger exemplifies the power of precedent, in which an “earlier decision
provides a reason for deciding a subsequent similar case the same way, and a
series of related precedents may crystallize a rule having almost the same force
as statutory rule.”34 Accordingly, unless there is a sudden and great shift in the
courts, it appears that student-athletes are not employees. The most current copy
(although not updated since the Biden administration has taken the helm) of the
Department of Labor’s Field Operations Handbook sums this up best:
As part of their overall educational program, public or private schools
and institutions of higher learning may permit or require students to
engage in activities in connection with dramatics, student publications,
glee clubs, bands, choirs, debating teams, radio stations, intramural and
interscholastic athletics and other similar endeavors. Activities of
students in such programs, conducted primarily for the benefit of the
participants as a part of the educational opportunities provided to the
students by the school or institution, are not work of the kind
contemplated by section 3(g) of the [National Labor Relations] Act and
do not result in an employer-employee relationship between the
student and the school or institution. Also, the fact that a student may

28

Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 292. These courts are the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of California, Second
Appellate District, Division One. Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); Van Horn v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457 (1963).
30
Berger, 843 F.3d at 292.
31 Id.
32 General
Counsel Memos, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD. (last visited Apr. 7, 2022),
https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/memos-research/general-counsel-memos.
33 Gregg E. Clifton & Bernard G. Dennis III, NLRB’s General Counsel Uses Prosecutorial Authority to
Assert Student-Athletes Are Employees, NAT’L L. REV. (last visited Apr. 7, 2022),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
nlrb-s-general-counsel-uses-prosecutorial-authority-to-assert-student-athletes-are#google_vignette.
34 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976).
29
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receive a minimal payment for participation in such activities would
not necessarily create an employment relationship.35

C. Other Issues with Unionization
Even in the unlikely scenario student-athletes were deemed to be employees,
other issues with unionization would lie in the way of unionization being the
answer to solving student-athletes’ issues.
First, there are numerous issues with public sector employees. As stated
above, the NLRA does not cover public sector employees. Additionally,
numerous states prohibit public sector employees from unionizing.36 This is an
issue because “the overwhelming majority of [college athletics] competitors are
public colleges and universities over which the [National Labor Relations]
Board cannot assert jurisdiction.”37 However, Abruzzo believes that this issue
could be circumvented under the joint employer theory of liability.38 Under the
joint employer theory of liability, Abruzzo believes that student-athletes are both
employees of their respective universities and the NCAA.39 Therefore, studentathletes could unionize because the NCAA is a private entity. 40 This attempted
circumvention is problematic. The joint employer theory of liability is an issue
that “puzzle[s] and divide[s] the courts.”41 Considering that courts have not even
deemed student-athletes employees of their own universities, it is difficult to
imagine courts going even a step further and declaring that student-athletes are
employees of the NCAA. This is especially true in the context of college
football, where the NCAA receives almost no revenue. This is because “[t]he
Division I College Football Playoff and bowl games are independently operated,

35 Field Operations Handbook Chapter 10: FLSA Coverage: Employment Relationship, Statutory
Exclusions,
Geographical
Limits,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FOH_Ch10.pdf (emphasis added).
36 See Sean Gregory, Here’s the Road Ahead for College Athletes After Union Setback, TIME (Aug. 18,
2015, 9:24 PM), https://time.com/4002245/after-union-setback-heres-the-road-ahead-for-college-athletes/
(“Other states limit, or prohibit, public employees from unionizing altogether: college athletes at the University
of Alabama, for example, have no constitutional or statutory right to collectively bargain. So a mass push to
unionize athletes at public schools isn’t entirely practical.”).
37 Nw. Univ., 362 NLRB 1350, 1352 (2015).
38 NLRB Memo GC 21-08, supra note 17, at *4.
39 Id.
40 See Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 532 (Ct. App. 2002) (The NCAA is “a
nonprofit organization of collegiate athletic conferences and other institutions.”).
41 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and
Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 605, 648 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
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and the NCAA does not receive revenue from these events.”42 Moreover, much
of the revenue from the regular season goes to the individual athletic
departments and the conferences, not the NCAA. 43 Interestingly, because of the
way college athletics is structured, the NCAA Men’s Basketball Division I
Tournament (commonly known as “March Madness”) constitutes over 90% of
the NCAA’s revenues,44 and “[o]f 90 NCAA championships, only five (all in
Division I) generate at least as much money as they cost to run: men’s basketball,
men’s ice hockey, men’s lacrosse, wrestling and baseball.”45 Outside of the
players who play in March Madness, basically no other student-athletes are
contributing to the NCAA’s pot of funds. Yet, Abruzzo believes that scholarship
football players at Division I FBS colleges and universities are entitled to receive
funds from the NCAA. The idea that someone can be an employee of an
organization to which they provide little monetary benefits to is difficult to
imagine. As an analogy, just because lawyers are governed by their state bar
organizations does not mean that they are employees of their state bar
organizations.
Second, there are issues with what interests the broad category of studentathletes share. As noted above, certain sports generate more money than others.
Additionally, certain athletic departments generate more money than others.46
“Nearly half a million college athletes make up the 19,886 teams that send more
than 57,661 participants to compete each year in the NCAA’s 90 championships
in 24 sports across 3 divisions.”47 It is difficult to imagine framing which groups
of student-athletes would unionize. Moreover, if certain men’s sports teams
were able to collectively bargain for more extensive benefits than women’s
teams in the same athletic department, that could violate Title IX.48 Furthermore,
42 Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2016/5/13/where-does-the-moneygo.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
43 See Andy Wittry, In FY20, revenue from media rights rose for most of the Power 5, NCAA distributions
decreased for (almost) all, OUT OF BOUNDS WITH ANDY WITTRY (June 9, 2021),
https://andywittry.substack.com/p/in-fy20-revenue-from-media-rights?s=r.
44 Tim Parker, How Much Does the NCAA Make Off March Madness?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031516/how-much-does-ncaa-make-march-madness.asp (last
updated Mar. 16, 2022).
45
Where Does the Money Go?, supra note 42.
46 See College Football Value Rankings, WALL ST. J., https://graphics.wsj.com/table/NCAA_2019 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2022).
47 What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/about-resources-media-centerncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
48 See Todd A. Cherry, Note, Declining Jurisdiction: Why Unionization Should Not Be the Ultimate Goal
for Collegiate Athletes, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1937, 1992 (concluding that “only providing benefits to revenuegenerating men’s athletic teams would conflict with Title IX, which requires universities to provide substantially
equal athletic opportunities for men’s and women’s athletic teams.”). Title IX refers to Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.
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the unionization of certain student-athletes could come at the expense of other
student-athletes.49 Accordingly, it appears that unionization is not the answer to
student-athlete underpayment. But there are areas of law outside of labor law
that could hold the solution.
II. POTENTIAL ANTITRUST REMEDIES
The remedies that can be provided in antitrust law are the answer to studentathlete underpayment. The workings of antitrust law are first described below to
establish why this is the case. Next, this Comment discusses why studentathletes are independent contractors. Then, there is an explanation of how
college athletic departments are price-fixing the labor of student-athletes. After
that, plaintiffs’ past successes in pursuing antitrust claims in the arena of college
sports are highlighted.
A. How Does Antitrust Law Work?
Antitrust law is “[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce
from restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination.”50 It “is
where the law meets the economic markets.”51 Additionally, in the spirit of this
journal, scholars have supported the idea that antitrust law is a “companion piece
of federal corporate governance law.”52 The main statutes that govern federal
antitrust law in the United States include the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Clayton Antitrust Act.53 These statutes are not too complex.54 Rather, they are
“short, general statements.”55
Because of their brevity, the judiciary has had to interpret what these
statutes mean when applied to varied conduct. It is likely no surprise,
then, that the interpretations of these statutes—and antitrust law
generally—have shifted over the last century. Many of these changes
reflect shifting views on Congress’s legislative intent in passing the
statutes. As these views change, certain judicially created rules have
49 See Roberto L. Corrada, College Athletes in Revenue-Generating Sports As Employees: A Look Into The
Alt-Labor Future, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187, 209 (2020) (“[T]he only schools that may be able to complete a
successful financial transition to a system in which student athletes are deemed employees at least in the short
term are athletes in Division I Power 5 Conference schools.”).
50 Antitrust law, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016).
51 ANDREA AGATHOKLIS MURINO & BRIAN N. DESMARAIS, ANTITRUST LAW FUNDAMENTALS (LexisNexis
2020).
52 Nathan Newman, The Conflict of the Courts: RICO, Labor, and Legal Preemption in Union
Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 307, 320 (2003).
53 ANDREA AGATHOKLIS MURINO & BRIAN N. DESMARAIS, supra note 53.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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come and gone, but the common law–like nature of antitrust practice
continues to build on itself.56

One of the recent areas that antitrust practice has evolved is in the realm of
college athletics. The Sherman Act is “[a]n 1890 federal statute that prohibits
direct or indirect interference with the freely competitive interstate production
and distribution of goods.”57 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is most applicable to
college athletics.58
In order to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must demonstrate: (1) that there was a contract, combination, or
conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under
either a per se rule of illegality, a “quick-look” analysis, or a rule of
reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate
commerce.59

The question whether the regulation of college sports satisfies the three
elements of the Sherman Act has been the subject of much litigation, with
varying results.60
Despite the economic differences between for-profit and non-profit
organizations, antitrust law is applicable to both forms of organizations.61 One
area where this rings true is within collegiate sports.
Historically, collegiate sports had been a wholly amateur endeavor
with little commercial impact and thus were shielded from antitrust
liability. Few could argue, however, that modern college sports have
[not] become big business, and accordingly, a tension has been created
between attempts to retain the purity of amateur sport and the desire to
maximize the revenue potential of collegiate athletic programs.
Attempts by organizations such as the NCAA to regulate college sports
have engendered litigation to determine whether such measures run
afoul of the federal antitrust laws.62
56

Id.
Sherman Antitrust Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016).
58 See Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Collegiate Sports, 87 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 43 (2014 & Supp. 2020). The Clayton Act is not really applicable to any federal antitrust litigation
regarding college sports. It is “[a] 1914 federal statute amending the Sherman Act to prohibit price
discrimination, tying arrangements, and exclusive-dealing contracts, as well as mergers and interlocking
directorates, if their effect might substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”
Clayton Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016).
59 Kaye, supra note 58, at 43.
60 Id.
61 Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982). See Tomas J. Philipson
& Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 52 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (2009).
62 Kaye, supra note 58, at 43.
57
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B. Student-Athletes Are Independent Contractors
An independent contractor is defined as:
Someone who is entrusted to undertake a specific project but who is
left free to do the assigned work and to choose the method for
accomplishing it . . . It does not matter whether the work is done for
pay or gratuitously. Unlike an employee, an independent contractor
who commits a wrong while carrying out the work usu[ally] does not
create liability for the one who did the hiring. 63

Student-athletes seem to fit this definition squarely.
First, student-athletes do “undertake a specific project” by playing for their
respective teams.
Second, while student-athletes do “receive[] instructions from a coach while
preparing for and playing . . . games,” they are “not otherwise controlled by the
coach.”64 Essentially, student-athletes, akin to independent contractors, just
contract their services out for the season while not being controlled like an
employer controls an employee. The recent loosening of the transfer portal
restrictions on student-athletes is indicative of this reality.65 The transfer portal
has shortened the duration of time that student-athletes are in exclusive
relationships with their universities in contrast to some of the Reid factors
relevant to the inquiry whether a worker is an employee that were discussed
above.66

63

Independent contractor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Hanson v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ohio 1986).
65 See, e.g., Ryan Glasspiegel, LSU Loses Entire Basketball Team to Transfer Portal, NBA Draft After Will
Wade Firing, N.Y. POST (Apr. 1, 2022, 4:48 PM), https://nypost.com/2022/04/01/entire-lsu-basketball-rosterchooses-to-leave-team-after-will-wade-firi/ (“The transfer portal, in practice, creates a college athlete free
agency every year. The LSU players are capitalizing on that, and who knows, maybe some will get a ‘strong ass’
offer and choose to return.”).
66 The counterargument could be made that duration of time is not indicative of whether an individual is
an employee because of the existence of seasonal employment. The Reid factors, discussed supra, should,
however, be analyzed in the aggregate. While duration of time alone is not strong enough to categorize someone
as an independent contractor rather than as an employee or vice versa, various Reid factors together are sufficient.
This article addresses some of these factors. Others are not addressed expressly but can be inferred as supportive
of the assertion that student-athletes are not employees. See, e.g., Laine Higgins, College Athletes Who Cashed
in Have a Painful New Homework Assignment: Their Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2022, 9:18 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/college-sports-taxes-nil-endorsements-11649928654 (“Most athletes qualify as
‘self-employed individuals’ on their tax return and need to submit a 1099 form for each gig they book.”).
Accordingly, if the Internal Revenue Code does not treat student-athletes as employees, then the NLRA should
not do so either. There should be congruence across the federal government.
64
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Third, some student-athletes do the work for pay (scholarships) and some
student-athletes do the work gratuitously (walk-ons).
Fourth, student-athletes who commit a wrong while carrying out their work
usually do not create liability for their universities.67
Accordingly, student-athletes appear to be independent contractors.
C. College Athletic Departments Are Price-Fixing the Labor of StudentAthletes
Price-fixing is defined as “the artificial setting or maintenance of prices at a
certain level, contrary to the workings of the free market.”68 Fixing the price of
labor, which is known as wage-fixing, is a form of price-fixing.69 Because
“price-fixing agreements are illegal per se under the Sherman Act,” wage-fixing
is illegal per se under the Sherman Act.70
While the NCAA has recently agreed to let student-athletes earn money from
their fame, student-athletes are still disallowed from being paid directly by their
universities beyond the cost of attendance.71 If students-athletes truly are
independent contractors, as this Comment argues, then the current rules set
around student-athlete pay appear to be the paradigm of wage-fixing.
Accordingly, college athletic departments are price-fixing the labor of studentathletes, and the courts need to resolve this.
D. Antitrust Success in the Past
As the prominent cases below illustrate, the courts are willing to levy
antitrust penalties against the NCAA.

67 See, e.g., Hanson, 494 N.E.2d at 1096 (holding that a college lacrosse player who committed wrongful
acts during a game was “not the agent of the university at the time he is playing the game of lacrosse”).
68 Price-fixing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
69 United States v. Jindal, 2021 WL 5578687, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2021), reconsideration denied sub
nom. United States v. Rodgers, 2022 WL 889942 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022).
70 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); see Jindal, 2021 WL 5578687, at
*5.
71 Alan Blinder, College Athletes May Earn Money From Their Fame, N.C.A.A. Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-nil-rules.html.
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1. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
Prior to NCAA v. Alston, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma was the leading case in collegiate antitrust law.72 It arose out of a
broadcasting rights dispute.73 The origins of this case were when the NCAA
entered into contracts with the American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) and
the Columbia Broadcasting System (“CBS”) in 1981.74 Under these contracts,
ABC and CBS would be granted exclusive carrying rights of NCAA football
games for the 1982-85 college football seasons.75 In return, ABC and CBS paid
a specified “minimum aggregate compensation to the participating NCAA
member institutions” of $131,750,000 during this period.76
Under this broadcasting plan, each team was given the right to negotiate with
the networks under some restrictions.77 The first (although not technically a
restriction, it still had extensive influence) was a recommended fee that the
NCAA set for telecast categories.78 The recommended fee was larger for certain
telecasts that were seen as more valuable than others.79 In descending order, the
recommended fees were in the following categories: (1) national telecasts, (2)
regional telecasts, (3) Division II, and (4) Division III football games.80
The second was an “appearance requirement.”81 Under the appearance
requirement, ABC and CBS would have to showcase at least 82 different teams
during two two-year periods: the 1982-83 college football seasons and the 198485 college football seasons.82
The third was an “appearance limitation.”83 Under the appearance limitation,
no team was eligible to appear on television more than six times total and more
72 See Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the
Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 289 (1993).
73 Id.
74 Susan Marie Kozik, Comment, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Association, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593, 598 (1985).
75 Id.
76 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 93 (1984). While this sounds like a
substantial amount of money, the NCAA’s revenue from its licensing and television agreements for 2021-24
will be worth around $3.5 billion. Christina Gough, NCAA television and licensing rights revenue 2011-2024,
STATISTA (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/219608/ncaa-revenue-from-television-rightsagreement/.
77 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 93.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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than four times on a national telecast during each of the respective two-year
periods. Additionally, these television appearances had to be divided equally
between ABC and CBS.84
A group of 63 NCAA member universities, including the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia, began a group called the College
Football Association (“CFA”) in 1977.85 According to University of Georgia
law professor James Ponsoldt, the reason that the CFA was formed was that
“[p]eople were just fed up with the NCAA’s parochialism, power grab, etc., but
also they wanted more money, they wanted to maximize and they wanted their
fans to be able to see them on TV.”86 In 1981, the CFA negotiated a television
contract with the National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”).87 This contract
would have given each CFA football team a greater number of television
appearances.88 Accordingly, it would have increased the total revenues of each
of the CFA members.89 Due to this contract, the NCAA threatened to impose
sanctions on CFA members’ athletic departments.90 In response to this threat,
the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of
Georgia Athletic Association sought and obtained a preliminary injunction in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma that
prevented the NCAA from intruding upon the CFA-NBC contract.91 However,
the $180 million television contract never came to fruition. 92 CFA Executive
Director Chuck Neinas reasoned that the deal never happened because
“[a]lthough a number of CFA members expressed interest in the NBC agreement
there was a continued concern about the possibility of the NCAA initiating
enforcement procedures.”93
After a full trial, the district court held that the NCAA violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.94 “The District Court defined the relevant market as
84

Id.
The College Football Association announced Monday that its attempt. . ., UPI (Dec. 14, 1981),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/12/14/The-College-Football-Association-announced-Monday-that-itsattempt/7716377154000/ [hereinafter CFA Announcement].
86 Mark Weiszer, Fall Saturdays will never be the same, ONLINEATHENS.COM, reprinted in College
Football
Association,
WIKIPEDIA
(Apr.
6,
2019,
1:20
AM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/College_Football_Association.
87 Kozik, supra note 74, at 599.
88 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 95.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Kozik, supra note 74, at 599.
92 CFA Announcement, supra note 85.
93 Id.
94 Kozik, supra note 74, at 599.
85
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‘live college football television’ because it found that alternative programming
has a significantly different and lesser audience appeal.”95 This relevant market
had been restrained in three fashions.96 First, the “NCAA fixed the price for
particular telecasts.”97 Second, the NCAA’s “exclusive network contracts were
tantamount to a group boycott of all other potential broadcasters and its threat of
sanctions against its own members constituted a threatened boycott of potential
competitors.”98 Third, the NCAA’s “plan placed an artificial limit on the
production of televised college football.”99
The NCAA asserted that their television policy (1) protected gate attendance
of its members and (2) maintained a competitive balance between its
members.100 However, this reasoning was rejected due to a lack of evidence.101
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision except for the boycott holding.102 Further, the Tenth Circuit held
that the NCAA television plan constituted illegal per se price-fixing because it
eliminated competition between college football television producers.103 The
NCAA then appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.104
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit, deciding to
apply the rule of reason test to this case rather than deeming it illegal per se
because of the nature of college football and its academic tradition.105 The Court
found that the question presented in this case was whether the challenged
restraint enhanced competition.106 The Court decided that the challenged
restraint did not enhance competition.107 Instead, it curtailed output and hindered
NCAA schools from responding to consumers’ preferences, consequently
restricting competition.108
95

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 95 (1984).
Id. at 96.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102
Id. at 600. The only part of the decision that was not affirmed by the Tenth Circuit was the district court’s
finding that the NCAA’s “exclusive network contracts were tantamount to a group boycott of all other potential
broadcasters and its threat of sanctions against its own members constituted a threatened boycott of potential
competitors.” Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 95.
103 Kozik, supra note 74, at 600.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 601.
106 Id. at 602.
107 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
108 Id.
96
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Justice Byron White, a former All-American halfback at the University of
Colorado, dissented in the case.109 He asserted that the NCAA’s television plan
was reasonable due in part to the noneconomic values of amateurism and
educational value in intercollegiate athletics.110
Justice White’s reasoning was not accepted, and college athletics continued
its journey into becoming the commercial juggernaut it is today. Long gone were
the days of college athletics as Justice White had experienced them when he was
a student-athlete.
2. O’Bannon v. NCAA
O’Bannon v. NCAA was once called “the most important decision ever on
amateurism in college sports.”111 This dispute arose out of a peculiar case of
video game rage.112
“In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball player at UCLA,
visited a friend’s house, where his friend’s son told O’Bannon that he was
depicted in a college basketball video game.”113 This video game was produced
by EA Sports.114 “The friend’s son turned on the video game, and O’Bannon
saw an avatar of himself.”115 O’Bannon was surprised to see this avatar of
himself because he “had never consented to the use of his likeness in the video
game, and he had not been compensated for it.”116
The next year in 2009, “O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate
Licensing Company (CLC), the entity which licenses the trademarks of the
NCAA and a number of its member schools for commercial use, in federal
court.”117 O’Bannon complained “that the NCAA’s amateurism rules, insofar as
they prevented student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their
NILs, were an illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 118
109

Kozik, supra note 74, at 603.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 135 (White, J., dissenting).
111 Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply the Rule of Reason: The O’Bannon Case, 114 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 73, 80 (2015).
112
See generally Victoria L. Dunckley, M.D., Video Game Rage, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 1, 2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mental-wealth/201212/video-game-rage.
113 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. NIL is an acronym that stands for “Name, Image, and Likeness.” It “is a term that describes the means
through which college athletes are allowed to receive financial compensation. NIL refers to the use of an athlete’s
name, image, and likeness through marketing and promotional endeavors. This can include autograph signings,
110
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A similar case had been filed by former Arizona State University and
University of Nebraska starting quarterback Sam Keller around the same time. 119
Both cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.120 The NCAA filed a motion to dismiss under the First
Amendment’s right-of-publicity.121 Both the district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that
the use of O’Bannon’s and Keller’s NILs were not protected under the First
Amendment’s right-of-publicity.122 In November 2013, this case was certified
as a class action.123 The class was deemed “all current and former studentathletes residing in the United States who compete on, or competed on, an
NCAA Division I . . . college or university men’s basketball team or on an
NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s football team.”124 These studentathletes’ NILs “may be, or have been, included or could have been included in
game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by Defendants, their coconspirators, or their licensees.”125
The cases against EA and the CLC were settled.126 The crux of the case
became (1) whether the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject to antitrust
laws and (2) if so, whether they were an unlawful restraint of trade. 127
Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case raised the issue of compensating studentathletes.128 District Judge Claudia Wilken held on August 8, 2014 that Division
I colleges and universities may pay their men’s basketball or FBS studentathletes a share of the revenue made from licensing these athletes’ NILs. 129 She
also prohibited the NCAA from disallowing student-athlete compensation.130
However, Wilken additionally determined that the NCAA could cap the amount
of this pay at $5000.131

product endorsements, social media posts, and more.” Everything You Need to Know About NIL, ICON SOURCE
(last visited Apr. 25, 2022), https://www.iconsource.com/everything-about-nil.html.
119 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123
Id.
124 Id. at 1055-56.
125 Id. at 1056.
126 Meghan R. Price, Case Note, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Cinderella Story,
22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 179, 181 n.17 (2015).
127 Id. at 181-83.
128 Id. at 182-83.
129 Id. at 184.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision, except for vacating the district court’s $5000 determination.132
The Ninth Circuit held that the NCAA’s compensation rules are subject to
antitrust regulation.133 First, the NCAA’s claim that Board of Regents declared
the NCAA’s amateurism rules “valid as a matter of law” was rejected. 134 Second,
it was determined that the NCAA’s compensation rules regulate “commercial
activity.”135 It was decided that Division I college football and men’s basketball
are commercial activity because both the players and the schools anticipate
economic gain from their activities.136 Third, it was determined that there were
significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market. 137 This relevant
market was defined as the “college education market.”138 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the NCAA that the NCAA’s compensation rules promoted
amateurism and integrated student-athletes with the respective schools’
academic communities.139 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA’s
claims that their compensation rules promoted competitive balance among
NCAA schools and improved output in the college education market.140 Fourth,
it was determined that there was a substantially less restrictive alternative to the
NCAA’s rules.141 This substantially less restrictive alternative was to cap the
proper amount of scholarships at the cost of attendance.142 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the district court and determined that allowing students to receive
cash compensation for their NILs was not a viable alternative. 143 The Ninth
Circuit stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes educationrelated compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap.”144 Therefore, it would surrender the
student-athletes’ status as amateurs.145

132

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
Id.
134 Id. at 1061.
135 Id. at 1064.
136 Id. at 1065.
137 Id. at 1070.
138
Id. at 1072.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1074.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1076.
144 Id. at 1078.
145 See id. at 1079 (“At that point the NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and
transitioned from its ‘particular brand of football’ to minor league status.”) (citing NCAA v. Bd. Of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 101-02, 104 (1984)).
133
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Chief Judge Sidney Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part in this
case.146 He would have affirmed the $5000 award granted by the district court.147
He asserted that the NCAA’s compensation rules should not be analyzed under
the preservation of amateurism but rather the preservation of popular demand
for college sports.148 He believed that the district court’s evidentiary findings
supported the idea that the $5000 award would not significantly reduce college
sports demand.149 Therefore, the district court’s entire judgment should have
been affirmed.150 While Judge Sidney Thomas’s dissenting opinion did not
represent the Court here, he would get a chance five years later to write a
majority opinion regarding antitrust and collegiate sports in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Alston v. NCAA.151
3. NCAA v. Alston
NCAA v. Alston is the most recent high-profile case concerning federal
antitrust law and collegiate athletics.152 This dispute arose out of a group of
challenges to the NCAA’s cap on the value of athletic scholarships. 153 These
challenges, filed between 2014 and 2015 during the O’Bannon litigation, were
led by former West Virginia University running back Shawne Alston and former
University of California, Berkeley basketball center Justine Hartman. 154 These
challenges were certified as a class action under the Alston v. NCAA umbrella
and consolidated into one case, which would analyze whether the NCAA’s limits
on student-athletes’ compensation violated federal antitrust law. 155 The plaintiffs
argued that if the NCAA’s limits were not in place at the time that they had
competed in collegiate athletics, they would have received greater compensation
146

Id. at 1079 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1083.
148 Id. at 1081.
149 Id. at 1083.
150 Id.
151 See Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-InAid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Alston, 208 L. Ed. 2d 504, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020), and cert. granted sub nom. Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston,
208 L. Ed. 2d 504, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2020), and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 210 L.
Ed. 2d 314, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
152 See Michael McCann, Justice Ginsburg’s Supreme Court Replacement to Shape Sports Industry,
SPORTICO (Sept. 22, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2020/justice-ginsbergs-supremecourt-replacement-to-shape-sports-industry-1234613502/.
153 Michael McCann, NCAA Asks Supreme Court to Review Scholarship Cash Limits, SPORTICO (Oct. 20,
2020, 2:55 AM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2020/ncaa-supreme-court-challenge-to-amateurism1234615100/.
154 Id.
155 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058,
1065 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
147
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for their athletic services that they were entitled to have. 156 The NCAA insisted
that its rules capping the value of athletic scholarships are pro-competitive.157 It
gave two reasons: (1) “the limits help preserve the demand for college sports
because consumers value amateurism as Defendants define it,” and (2) “the rules
promote integration of student-athletes into their academic communities, which
in turn improves the college education they receive in exchange for their
services.”158
The question presented in this case was whether “the law compel[s] the
NCAA to allow member schools to compete for recruits by offering financial
benefits that reflect recruits’ actual value.”159 In an opinion by the same author
as O’Bannon’s district court decision, Judge Claudia Wilken of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that the law does
compel the NCAA to expand financial benefits to athletes beyond what the prior
rules had allowed.160
First, the district court determined that O’Bannon is not preclusive.161 The
district court identified “material factual differences” between the Alston and
O’Bannon.162 Some of these differences include: (1) “the identity of class
members”163 and (2) “the rules and rights at issue.”164
Second, the district court determined the relevant market in this case.165 The
relevant market was the market of student-athletes selling their “labor in the
form of athletic services” to colleges and universities in return for scholarships
and other benefits that the NCAA allowed student-athletes to receive.166
Third, the district court determined whether there were anticompetitive
effects within this relevant market.167 The district court found that there indeed
were anticompetitive effects within this relevant market.168 It was determined
that schools exercised monopsony power which artificially capped the fair value
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id.
McCann, supra note 153.
In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Ath. Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1110.
Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 958 F.3d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141

(2021).
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

164

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 10

of student-athletes’ services.169 The district court asserted if not for the
challenged restraints, student-athletes would indeed receive higher
compensations.170 The district court illustrated this point by pointing to evidence
such as the “palatial athletic facilities and seven-figure coaches’ salaries” in
collegiate athletics.171 The district court pointed out that it seemed as if schools
were allowed to spend on virtually anything except for direct financial support
for student-athletes.172 Accordingly, there were “significant anticompetitive
effects in the relevant market.”173
Fourth, the district court determined whether the NCAA had procompetitive
justifications for their restrictions on student-athletes’ athletic scholarships.174
The district court accepted the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications with
respect to the NCAA’s limits on cash compensation “untethered to
education,”175 but not as to its restrictions on “non-cash education-related
benefits.”176 The district court said that the concept of amateurism in NCAA
athletics does not directly foster consumer demand.177 The opinion pointed out
that the NCAA permits other payments above a student-athlete’s cost of
attendance and that these challenged rules: (1) “do not follow any coherent
definition of amateurism . . . or even ‘pay,’”178 and (2) these payments have not
had a negative effect on consumer demand for college sports, which “remain[]
exceedingly popular and revenue-producing.”179 Moreover, the district court
found the NCAA’s economic expert unreliable because of the expert’s failure to
recognize many important aspects of consumer demand for NCAA sports. 180
Meanwhile, the district court found the student-athletes’ experts persuasive in
light of evidence finding that there have not been any negative effects on
consumer demand for NCAA sports in light of some recent increases in
compensation for student-athletes and the evidence the student-athletes
proffered from survey respondents.181 The district court did not go as far as to
allow unlimited payments unrelated to education to student-athletes, though.182
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1250-51.
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The district court acknowledged how important consumer demand was to
maintaining a difference between college sports and professional sports.183
Some of the NCAA’s rules that the district court approved included: (1) “the
COA limit on the grant-in-aid,”184 (2) “limits on compensation unrelated to
education,”185 and (3) “limits on cash awards for graduating or other academic
achievements.”186 However, the district court disapproved the NCAA’s
restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits.”187
Fifth, the district court analyzed less restrictive alternatives.188 Two
alternatives were rejected for allowing “professional-style cash payments.”189
However, a third alternative was seen as viable.190 This alternative would do
three things. First, it would “allow the NCAA to continue to limit grants-in-aid
at not less than the [COA].” Second it would “allow the [NCAA] to continue to
limit compensation and benefits unrelated to education.” Third, it would “enjoin
NCAA limits on most compensation and benefits that are related to education,
but allow it to limit education-related academic or graduation awards and
incentives, as long as the limits are not lower than its limits on athletic
performance awards now or in the future.”191
The district court then listed out some of the education-related benefits that
the NCAA would not be allowed to prohibit.192 These benefits included: (1)
computers, (2) science equipment, (3) musical instruments, (4) other items
related to academics, (5) post-eligibility scholarships, (6) tutoring, (7) studyabroad costs, and (8) paid post-eligibility internships.193 The district court
permitted the NCAA to cap these awards, but they could not cap it at an amount
below $5600, “the existing limit on aggregate athletic participation awards.” 194
However, an individual conference or school within the NCAA could cap
awards below this amount because conferences do not “dominate” the relevant
market as the NCAA does.195 The district court asserted that this less restrictive

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
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Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1251.
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alternative would not turn student-athletes into professionals.196 The district
court even said that this less restrictive alternative would not significantly
increase the NCAA’s costs because the NCAA would save money from
decreased enforcement costs.197
Sixth, the district court put forth the remedy for the plaintiffs in this case. 198
The remedy was to implement the less restrictive alternative described in the
preceding paragraph via a permanent injunction.199 The remedy did give the
NCAA some flexibility in how they would implement this less restrictive
alternative.200 For example, the schools’ athletic departments could pay students
directly or they could pay students after the fact when sufficient proof of
purchase would be shown to the athletic department.201 Finally, the point that
individual conferences or schools within the NCAA could cap awards was
reiterated.202 This injunction was stayed pending resolution of a timely appeal
when Judge Sidney Thomas and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided Alston a little over a year after the district court’s March 2019
decision in the peculiar time period of May 2020.203
The Ninth Circuit began by explaining that the stare decisis and res judicata
issues in Alston would be reviewed de novo.204 Moreover, it was explained that
factual findings are reviewed for clear error while legal conclusions are reviewed
de novo.205 In describing the clear error/clearly erroneous standard for the
reviewal of factual findings, Judge Sidney Thomas whimsically stated that the
factual findings of the district court are not clearly erroneous unless they
“strike[] us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
fish.”206 Also, the permanent injunction granted by the district court was
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.207
The Ninth Circuit decided that the district court correctly decided that
O’Bannon did not foreclose Alston as a matter of stare decisis and res judicata.208
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253 (quoting Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 968 n.23 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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They supported this assertion by showing distinguishing facts differing
O’Bannon and Alston.209 These distinguishing facts are critical because
“[a]ntitrust decisions are particularly fact-bound.”210 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the NCAA bore the burden of proving that Alston should
be foreclosed as a matter of res judicata.211 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
NCAA did not satisfy this burden because the antitrust claims in Alston arose
after the O’Bannon record closed in August 2014.212 The Ninth Circuit put forth
that these new claims included “permissible above-COA payments alongside a
growth in revenues from FBS football and D1 basketball.”213
Next, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “[t]he district court properly granted
judgment on the Student-Athletes’ Sherman Act § 1 claim.” 214 They analyzed
this ruling under a three-step framework:
(1) Student-Athletes bear[] the initial burden of showing that the
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant
market; (2) if they carry that burden, the NCAA must come forward
with evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects; and (3)
Student-Athletes must then show that any legitimate objectives can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.215

The Ninth Circuit decided that “[t]he district court properly concluded that
the Student-Athletes carried their burden at the first step of the Rule of
Reason.”216 The Ninth Circuit ruled this way because of the belief that studentathletes lack viable alternatives to play sports at an elite level after high school
outside of the NCAA.217

209

Id. at 1253-55.
Id. at 1253.
211 Id. at 1255.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1256.
214 Id.
215 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
216
Id.
217 Id. at 1257. Quaere whether this was or is still true. See, e.g., Michael LoRé, After Successful Inaugural
Season, Overtime Elite Wants To Keep Forging Alternative Path To Pro Basketball, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2022,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellore/2022/03/22/overtime-elite-to-build-off-of-successfulinaugural-season/?sh=12c1bcde3df9 (“Founded in March 2021 by Overtime co-founders and former WME
executives Dan Porter and Zack Weiner, Overtime Elite (OTE) offers prospects who leave high school and
forfeit their NCAA eligibility a six-figure contract plus bonuses, the ability to profit off their name, likeness and
image (NIL), equity in Overtime, an education including life skills like financial literacy and media training, but
most importantly, an alternative path to the professional ranks with the NBA the dream destination for most, if
not all.”).
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In the second step of the three-step framework, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
“the district court fairly found that NCAA compensation limits preserve demand
to the extent they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to professional salaries,
but not insofar as they restrict certain education-related benefits.”218 In line with
the district court, the Ninth Circuit found the NCAA’s procompetitive
justification of amateurism unpersuasive in regards to the NCAA’s former
compensation procedures.219
In the third step of the three-step framework, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the district court “did not clearly err” in determining the least restrictive
alternative.220 First, the Ninth Circuit said that “[t]he district court reasonably
concluded that uncapping certain education-related benefits would preserve
consumer demand for college athletics just as well as the challenged rules do.”221
It was reasoned that the uncapping is not congruous to professional salaries. 222
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit asserted that these “limited” costs would not “repel
college sports fans.”223 Second, the Ninth Circuit determined that “[t]he district
court did not clearly err in finding that this LRA will not result in significantly
increased costs.”224 The Ninth Circuit said that in addition to being supported by
the record, it was “commonsense” that the new education-related benefits would
actually save the NCAA money because otherwise the NCAA would have spent
even more money on enforcing the caps that they previously had set.225
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit examined the district court’s injunction.226 The
Ninth Circuit determined that the district court’s injunction was proper, and the
injunction was affirmed.227 The NCAA contended that the district court’s
injunction went too far.228 However, the Ninth Circuit combated this contention
by determining that the injunction was not unreasonably vague, nor did the
injunction usurp the NCAA’s role.229 Conversely, the student-athletes contended
that the district court’s injunction did not go far enough.230 The student-athletes
wanted the Ninth Circuit to uncap all NCAA compensation limits, including
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1260 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
Id. at 1257-60.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1262.
Id.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1263-64.
Id. at 1263.
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those unrelated to education.231 However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
NCAA had the procompetitive justification of distinguishing college sports from
professional sports.232 Therefore, the NCAA’s restrictions on payments
unrelated to education should stay intact.233
To conclude his opinion, Judge Sidney Thomas repeated an observation from
his concurrence in O’Bannon: “The national debate about amateurism in college
sports is important. But our task as appellate judges is not to resolve it. Nor could
we. Our task is simply to review the district court judgment through the
appropriate lens of antitrust law and under the appropriate standard of
review.”234 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly
determined that the NCAA’s limits on education-related benefits did not “play
by the Sherman Act’s rules.”235 Accordingly, the district court’s liability
determination and injunction were affirmed.236
As referenced at the beginning of this article, Judge Milan Smith penned a
spirited concurring opinion in Alston.237 Judge Smith joined the opinion in full,
however, he wanted to express some concerns about the outcome.238 He wrote
that “the current state of our antitrust law reflects an unwitting expansion of the
Rule of Reason inquiry in a way that deprives the young athletes in this case
(Student-Athletes) of the fundamental protections that our antitrust laws were
meant to provide them.”239 He detailed the unfairness and the plights he believes
that student-athletes unfairly endure.240 In contrast, he discussed how NCAA
colleges and universities bring in billions of dollars from college athletics. 241
Rather frankly, Judge Smith stated that “the law is a ass—a idiot.”242 Judge
Smith believes that student-athletes are not competing within a free market.243
Instead, he believes that the NCAA is a cartel.244 The concurring opinion
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234 Id. at 1265 (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
235 Id. (citation omitted).
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Id. at 1266.
237 See id. at 1266-71 (Smith, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 1266.
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240 Id.
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242 Id. at 1267 (quoting Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1681 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting)) (quoting
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 277 (Wordsworth Ed. 1992) (1867)).
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criticized the precedents of the Board of Regents and O’Bannon cases described
above for not preserving economic freedom.245 Judge Smith argues that the
courts should get rid of the precedent established in these two cases which allows
defendants to keep on doing as they are doing if they can justify their
anticompetitive actions by proving procompetitive effects in a collateral
market.246 Instead, Judge Smith argues that the Ninth Circuit should follow the
reasoning of United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.247
In Smith, the D.C. Circuit held that the National Football League Draft
violated the Sherman Act.248 Although the NFL asserted that the NFL draft had
procompetitive effects for the league, the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument
because of the anticompetitive effects within the defined “market for players’
services.”249 Therefore, the NFL draft was not permissible under the second step
of federal antitrust law’s rule of reason analysis.250 However, because the
National Football League Players Association has agreed to sanction the NFL
Draft through various collective-bargaining agreements, the NFL Draft is still in
existence today.251 In Judge Smith’s view, a “cross-market Rule of Reason
analysis frustrates the very purpose of the antitrust laws.”252 Therefore, he would
like to overturn this method of examining antitrust cases in a dispute that directly
raises the issue.253
On October 15, 2020, the NCAA along with a group of NCAA conferences
petitioned for a writ of certiorari in NCAA v. Alston.254 NCAA chief legal
officer, Donald M. Remy, released a statement after the petition was filed which
succinctly summed up the NCAA’s arguments:
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Id. at 1267-69.
Id. at 1271.
247 Smith v. Pro-Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
248 Eriq Gardner, Rookie Abuse, SLATE (Apr. 23, 2009, 5:57 PM), https://slate.com/culture/2009/04/in1970-james-yazoo-smith-sued-the-nfl-to-shut-down-the-draft-what-happened-next.html.
249 Alston, 958 F.3d at 1269.
250
Id.
251 Gardner, supra note 248.
252 Alston, 958 F.3d at 1271.
253 Id.
254 Stacey Osburn, NCAA statement regarding Supreme Court petition for Alston case, NCAA (Oct. 15,
2020, 10:32 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-regarding-supremecourt-petition-alston-case; see Mike Leonard, Supreme Court to Review NCAA Student-Athlete Compensation
Case, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2020, 8:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-16/ncaa-sathletic-scholarship-caps-to-get-supreme-court-review (“The NCAA’s top conferences also filed a parallel
petition.”).
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Today, the NCAA asked the U.S. Supreme Court to grant review of
the Alston/Grant-in-Aid case. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is
applying antitrust laws to NCAA student-athlete rules inconsistently
with other federal circuits and indeed the Supreme Court itself. The
ruling blurs the line between student-athletes and professionals,
conflicts with prior appellate court decisions, appoints a single court to
micromanage collegiate sports, and encourages never-ending litigation
following every rule change. The decision extends beyond the
NCAA’s ability to govern college sports throughout the country,
affecting how other joint ventures operate. It is critical for the Supreme
Court to address the consequential legal errors in this case so that
college sports can be governed, not by the courts, but by those who
interact with and lead students every day. Together with our
conferences that were individually sued in this matter, we will continue
to defend the line between professional sports and college sports.255

On November 9, 2020, the student-athletes filed an opposition brief in the
case.256 On November 24, 2020, the NCAA and the conferences filed reply
briefs in the case.257 On December 16, 2020, the United States Supreme Court
granted the petition to hear Alston with the NCAA and the conferences as
consolidated petitioners.258 The NCAA and the student-athletes both had
attorneys comment on the case.259 Remy released another statement stating:
We are pleased the U.S. Supreme Court will review the NCAA’s right
to provide student-athletes with the educational benefits they need to
succeed in school and beyond. The NCAA and its members continue
to believe that college campuses should be able to improve the student-
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athlete experience without facing never-ending litigation regarding
these changes.260

Considering how rarely the Supreme Court grants a petition of certiorari261
and the Supreme Court’s previous rejection of O’Bannon,262 Jeffrey Kessler, a
lead attorney for the student-athletes said that he was “surprised”263 that the
Supreme Court took Alston. However, Kessler said that his team felt “very
confident”264 about their position in Alston and that they were “looking forward
to having this case heard.”265 Oral argument was heard by the Supreme Court on
March 31, 2021, and the Supreme Court’s decision for Alston was released on
June 21, 2021.266
In this June 2021 9-0 opinion written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district and circuit courts.267 First,
the Court concluded that the district court properly used the rule of reason
analysis rather than a quick-look analysis.268 Second, the Court determined that
the Board of Regents case discussed above did not create binding precedent that
supported the NCAA’s current compensation structure.269 Third, the Court
260 Stacey Osburn, U.S. Supreme Court grants petition for Alston case, NCAA (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:10 AM),
http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/us-supreme-court-grants-petition-alston-case.
261 See McCann, supra note 153 (“cert is ordinarily granted about 1% to 2% of the time”).
262 See Amanda Christovich, NCAA Asks Supreme Court to Review Alston Case, FRONT OFFICE SPORTS
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://frontofficesports.com/alston-supreme-court-request/ (“the petition identifies the exact
same legal issues previously raised by the NCAA with respect to the prior O’Bannon litigation that the NCAA
lost, and the Supreme Court declined to review those issues at that time”).
263 Supreme Court agrees to hear NCAA athlete compensation case, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:19
AM),
https://
abcnews.go.com/Sports/supreme-court-agrees-hear-ncaa-athlete-compensation-case/story?id=74760159.
264 Heitner, supra note 259.
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payments, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 21, 2021, 8:23 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/ncaa-athletes-getunanimous-win-on-educational-perks-as-kavanaugh-calls-out-limits-on-direct-payments/.
267 See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
268 The Supreme Court 2020 Term: Leading Case: III. Federal Statute: Federal Statute and Treaty:
Sherman Act—Antitrust Law—College Athletics—NCAA v. Alston, 135 HARV. L. REV. 471, 474 [hereinafter
Harvard Alston Case Note]. A rule of reason analysis is defined as “[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a trade
practice violates the Sherman Act only if the practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade, based on the totality
of economic circumstances.” Rule of reason, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The quick-look
analysis is an “abbreviated version of the rule of reason analysis, the court does not need to conduct the rigorous
analysis of the market and anticompetitive effects that the rule of reason requires. Instead, the plaintiff need only
show a form of market injury.” Antitrust Standards of Review: The Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Quick Look
Tests, BONA LAW (last visited Apr. 10, 2022), https://www.bonalaw.com/insights/legal-resources/antitruststandards-of-review-the-per-se-rule-of-reason-and-quick-look-tests. The quick-look analysis is “sometimes
given to joint ventures.” Harvard Alston Case Note, supra, at 474.
269 Harvard Alston Case Note, supra note 268, at 474.
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determined that the NCAA is a commercial enterprise subject to enforcement
under the Sherman Act.270 Fourth, the Court held that lifting the cap on
educational benefits that student-athletes can receive did not constitute
impermissible judicial micromanagement.271
Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a fiery concurring opinion.272 Kavanaugh
asserted that the “NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also raise serious
questions under the antitrust laws.”273 He said that “the NCAA’s business model
would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America” because of the
way the NCAA restricts its student-athletes through wage-fixing.274 Kavanaugh
ended his concurrence by saying that “[t]he NCAA is not above the law.” 275
CONCLUSION
The underpayment of student-athletes is a serious problem. Student-athletes
deserve fair wages at a market rate.276 While unionization is not the answer to
underpayment of student-athletes, the remedies that can be provided in antitrust
law seem to be the answer. As illustrated above, it appears that the courts are
willing to impose antitrust penalties on the NCAA. Justice Kavanaugh has
thrown the perfect alley-oop pass, and it is time for the right plaintiffs to make a
slam dunk.
EVAN S. NELSON
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